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Abstract:  
The, often observed, positive correlation between incentive intensity and risk has 
been explained in two ways : the presence of transaction costs as determinants of 
contracts and the sorting of risk-tolerant individuals into firms using high-intensity 
incentive contracts. The empirical importance of sorting is perhaps best evaluated by 
directly measuring the risk tolerance of workers who have selected into incentive 
contracts under risky environments. We use experiments, conducted within a real 
firm, to measure the risk preferences of a sample of workers who are paid incentive 
contracts and face substantial daily income risk. Our experimental results indicate the 
presence of sorting ; Workers in our sample are risk-tolerant. Moreover, their level of 
tolerance is considerably higher than levels observed for samples of individuals 
representing broader populations. Interestingly, the high level of risk tolerance 
suggests that both sorting and transaction costs are important determinants of 
contract choices when workers have heterogeneous preferences. 
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1 Introduction
Contracts play a fundamental role in the economic theory of the firm. Economic theorists have
highlighted the ability of contracts to solve moral hazard problems (see, for example, Stiglitz
(1975) Hart and Holmstro¨m (1987), Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987)) and to reduce transac-
tions costs (Barzel, 1989). Recent empirical work has focussed attention on determining the
relevance of these contracting models (Prendergast, 2000). Central to this debate is the role
of risk and the risk preferences of workers in determining observed contracts. Moral hazard
models are based on two premises: individuals react to incentives, and optimal contracts must
balance incentives with risk sharing. If risk is important within the contracting environment
then observed contracts will vary with risk in predictable ways, giving empirical content to the
agency model. However, many studies of actual contracts have failed to detect a role for risk
that is consistent with theoretical predictions; see, for example, Allen and Lueck, 1992.1 These
studies conclude that transaction costs prevent the implementation of optimal contracts, and
thus are important determinants of contract choices.
A major difficulty facing empirical work on contracts is that many of the forcing variables
are unobservable. Risk aversion, the cost of effort, and, even perhaps, risk itself have no direct
observable counterparts. Unobservability greatly complicates testing the theory. Even if risk
levels were observable, comparative static results are conditional on unobservable preferences.
If workers sort themselves across contracts on the basis of specific preferences, then regression
methods seeking to measure the effects of risk on contracts will confound changes in risk with
changes in unobserved preferences. This can potentially bias the coefficient estimates and, in
turn, downplay the importance of sorting as an explanation of contract choice determination
relative to transaction costs (Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002).2
Perhaps the most direct way to evaluate the sorting hypothesis is to conduct preference-
revealing experiments. Such experiments have been used in agricultural economics to charac-
1In contrast, empirical studies have produced strong evidence that worker react to the incentives embodied
within contracts; see, Paarsch and Shearer (1999, 2005), Lazear (2000) for evidence based on personnel records and
Shearer (2004) for evidence from a field experiment.
2An alternative explanation is that firms choose their compensation systems optimally. Prendergast (2000, 2002)
has argued that high-variance environments reduce the efficiency of monitoring inputs, leading firms to use output-
based payment systems in these environments.
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terize the risk attitudes of farmers (Binswanger, 1980). More recently, Holt and Laury (2002)
have developed experimental methods that allow a more precise characterization of risk pref-
erences. Their work, conducted within experimental laboratories, suggests that approximately
25 percent of participants are risk-neutral or risk-loving. If sorting arguments can explain the
seemingly aberrant estimates of the effect of risk on incentives, then workers who work un-
der risky incentive contracts should exhibit behaviour which is consistent with risk-neutral or
risk-loving preferences.
In this paper we present direct evidence on the applicability of the sorting hypothesis in
the labour market. We exploit data from a field experiment to characterize the risk preferences
of a sample of workers who are paid incentive contracts. The experiment, inspired by the
work of Holt and Laury (2002), was conducted within a tree-planting firm operating in British
Columbia, Canada. The workers of this firm are paid piece rates and face substantial daily
earnings risk due to random planting conditions.
Our results suggest that a significant proportion of the workers in this firm (between 39%
and 46%) were risk loving or risk neutral. These figures are considerably higher than existing
results from experiments performed on broader populations; see, for example, Holt and Laury
(2002) and Elston, Harrisson, and Rutstro¨m (2005). We find no evidence to suggest that mea-
sured risk preferences are related to past accumulated earnings (productivity), age, or gender.
We also show that our results are not sensitive to the payoff scales used in the experiment.
We argue that these results provide support for the sorting argument: contracts that expose
workers to risk, attract workers who are risk-tolerant. Consequently, empirical work aiming
to uncover the relationship between risk and contracts by considering different classes of risk-
bearing contracts, must account for sorting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides institutional details
of the tree-planting industry in British Columbia. In section 3, we present the experimental
design. In section 4, we present and analyse the data. In section 5, we discuss the implications
of our results and conclude.
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2 Tree Planting in British Columbia
2.1 The Industry
While timber is a renewable resource, active reforestation can increase the speed at which
forests regenerate and also allows the control of species composition. In British Columbia,
extensive reforestation is undertaken by both the Ministry of Forests and the major timber-
harvesting firms.
Tracts of land that have recently been logged are allocated to tree-planting firms through a
process of competitive bidding. These auctions typically take place in the autumn of the year
preceding the planting season, which generally runs from early spring through to late summer.
Tree-planting firms submit bids over the price per tree (or bid price) that they will receive to
complete a given contract. These bids are calculated after having observed the planting con-
ditions (eg. the slope and rockiness of the terrain) on the land to be planted. These conditions
affect the number of trees that can be planted in a given day and therefore affect labour costs.
The lowest-bidding firm wins the contract, returning to the site the following year with hired
workers to plant trees.
Tree planting is a simple, yet physically exhausting, task. It involves digging a hole with a
special shovel, placing a seedling in this hole, and then covering its roots with soil, ensuring
that the tree is upright and that the roots are fully covered. The amount of effort required to
perform the task depends on the terrain on which the planting is done and weather conditions.
Flat plateaux are much easier to plant than steep mountain sides and hard, rocky soil is more
difficult to plant than soft terrain. British Columbia is a very mountainous region of Canada;
the terrain can vary a great deal from site to site.
Planters are predominantly paid using piece-rate contracts, although fixed wages are used
on occasion.3 Under piece-rate contracts, planters are paid in proportion to their output. Gen-
erally, no explicit base wage or production standard exists, although firms are governed by
minimum-wage laws. Output is measured as the number of trees planted per day.
3See Paarsch and Shearer (2000) for a discussion of when firms use fixed wage contracts and the effects of these
contracts on worker productivity.
4
2.2 The Tree-Planting Firm
Our experiment was conducted within a medium sized tree-planting firm that employed a
total of 78 planters in the 2005 planting season. The planters represent a very broad group
of individuals, including returning seasonal workers and students working on their summer
holidays. They range in age from 19 to 56.
This firm pays its planters piece rates, exclusively; daily earnings for a planter are deter-
mined by the product of the piece rate and the number of trees the planter planted on that
day. Blocks to be planted typically contain between 20 and 30 planter-days of work, with some
lasting over 100 planter-days. For each block, the firm decides on a piece rate that applies to
all planting done on that block. Planting conditions vary across and within blocks. For exam-
ple, while a given block may be appear uniform on the surface, some parts of the block can be
characterized by rocky soil under the surface, making planting more difficult. Given the firm
cannot completely know the undersoil conditions for the whole block, some planters will in-
variably end up working in more difficult conditions, under the same contract. These random
elements expose planters to daily income risk.
Contracts, comprising a number of blocks in the same geographic area, are planted by crews
of workers under a supervisor. Each crew typically has from 10 to 15 planters. All workers
planting on the same block receive the same piece rate; no matching of workers to planting
conditions occurs. Typically, planters are assigned to plots within a block as they disembark
from the ground transportation taking them to the planting site. Thus, to a first approximation,
planters were randomly assigned to plots.
2.3 Earnings Risk
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the 2005 planting season for planters who participated
in our experiment. The average daily number of trees planted is 833.94, with a large standard
deviation (426.08). The average daily earnings is $196.12 with a standard deviation of $66.43.
Planters have, on average, worked 21.36 days before taking part in the experiment, again with
a sizeable standard deviation. It is possible to decompose the total variation in productivity in
one part due to differences in productivity across planters and another part reflecting differ-
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ences in daily planting conditions.4 We find that 57.1% of total variation in daily productivity
can be explained by variations in day-to-day planting conditions, while 42.9% of the total vari-
ation is accounted for by productivity differences across planters. Similar results apply when
we look at daily earnings. We find that only 39.2% of the total variation in daily earnings re-
flects variation in productivity across planters. This implies that 60.2% of the daily variation
in earnings (a standard deviation of approximately 51$) can be attributed to daily variation
in planting conditions and piece rates, indicating considerable earnings variability beyond the
planters’ control.
3 Experimental design
The field experiment took place on five consecutive mornings during the first week of May,
2005. Each morning, we met with a different crew of planters for approximately twenty minutes
before the crew set out to their planting site. The size of the crews varied from day to day, rang-
ing between 5 and 25 planters.
To begin, we introduced ourselves as economists conducting a study on the behavior of
workers in the presence of risk. The planters were informed that they would receive a 10$ fee
for their participation in this study, plus an additional sum which would depend on the choices
they made and chance. Participation was voluntary. Each planter who agreed to participate
was given paper instructions, a decision sheet, a clipboard, and an ink pen.5 We then read
aloud the instructions on the experiment and on how to fill in the decision sheet. We used an
oversized copy of the decision sheet to assist us in describing the experiment.
To complete the experiment, each planter had to make 10 decisions. Each decision consisted
4The decomposition is based on the following model of daily productivity yit
yit = α + µi + εit
where α is an intercept, µi represents fixed planter-specific, time-invariant productivity effects, and εit represents
other unsystematic differences in planting conditions. Under the assumption that µi is independent of εit, the total
variance in yit is given by
V(yit) = V(µi) +V(εit)
The share of the total variance due to day-to-day variation in planting conditions is simply V(εit)/V(yit).
5There were no cases of planters refusing to participate.
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of choosing one of two binary lotteries. A summary of the decisions can be found in Table 2.
The actual decision screen is presented in appendix A. The lotteries used were inspired by the
experimental design developed by Holt and Laury (2002) to determine the risk aversion of
an individual. For each decision there is a ”safe” lottery, denoted A, which pays either a low
payoff of $16.00 or a high payoff of $20.00, and a ”risky” lottery, denoted B, which pays either
a low payoff of $1.00 or a high payoff of $38.50. Which of the high or low payoffs materialized,
was determined by chance.
For the first decision, the probability of the high payoff for both lotteries is 10%, so only an
extreme risk seeker would choose lottery B. As can be seen in the far right column of Table 2, the
expected payoff difference between lotteries A and B, for the first decision, is $11.70. The prob-
ability of winning the high payoff increases gradually as we move down the Table, increasing
the relative payoff of the risky lottery B. Consequently, an individual should eventually cross
over and start choosing lottery B as he/she moves down the decision sheet. In fact, for the last
decision, the high payoff of each lottery is paid with probability 1 ($20 for lottery A, and $38.50
for lottery B). This means that even very risk averse individuals should choose lottery B in the
last decision.
The pattern of decisions for a given planter can be related to existing utility functions rep-
resenting preferences over risk. With constant relative risk aversion for money x, for example,
the utility function is u(x) = x1−r for x > 0 and where r denotes the coefficient of relative risk
aversion. This specification implies risk loving behavior for r < 0, risk neutrality for r = 0, and
risk aversion for r > 0. The payoffs for the lottery choices in the experiment are such that the
crossover point from lottery A to lottery B provides an interval estimate of a subject’s coeffi-
cient of relative risk aversion. The payoff numbers for the lotteries are such that a risk neutral
decision pattern (four safe choices followed by six risky choices) is consistent with a constant
relative risk aversion coefficient r in the interval (-0.15, 0.15). Similar intervals can be obtained
for other functional forms of utility, namely constant absolute risk aversion.
After we described the decisions they would be making, planters were informed that, once
their decisions were made, one of their ten decisions would be randomly chosen and played out
to determine their earnings. To select which of the ten lotteries would be played, each planter
would first draw a poker chip from an opaque, black bag, containing identical chips numbered
from 1 to 10. The number drawn would select the lottery to be played. We would then replace
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the chip in the bag, shuffled the bag, and ask the planter to draw a chip for a second time, this
time to determine the outcome of the selected lottery, and thus the planter’s lottery earnings.6
Planters were informed that their lottery earnings and participation fee would be added
to their next pay check. After having read the instructions, participants were allowed to ask
clarifying questions. We then asked each planter to make their decisions individually and in
silence. Planters who completed their decision sheets were asked to come forward to draw
their poker chips.
Each daily session took on average 15 minutes. In total, all 51 planters of the firm who
worked during that week participated in the field experiment. The average earnings during
the experiment (which took approximately 20 minutes of the planter’s time) was $30 (including
the participation fee). Since average daily earnings was approximately $200 for an eight-hour
day, the average experimental earnings is just under four times what a planter could expect
to earn in a twenty-minute spell of planting. Moreover, the difference between the high and
low payoffs in the risky lottery B (37.50$) is just under a one standard deviation in observed
daily earnings risk (51$, see Section 2.3). Consequently, the experiment represents considerable
payoffs to the planters, and the risky lottery offers a realistic variation in earnings.
4 Results
Table 3 presents the results of the experiment. The first column indicates the number of safe
choices made in the experiment. The second column presents the interval around the coefficient
of relative risk aversion r which is consistent with a given number of safe choices. The third
column presents the typology used by Holt and Laury (2002) to classify risk preferences. As can
be seen from the Table, risk neutral individuals should choose 4 times the safe lottery before
crossing over and choosing the risky lottery. Risk loving individuals make less than 4 safe
choices, while risk averse planters make more than 4 safe choices. The fourth column presents
the cumulative distributions of the number of safe choices made in the baseline experiment for
6For example, a planter who selected the number 4 on his first draw would play lottery A.4 if he had selected
lottery A for decision 4 and B.4 if he had selected lottery B. If his second draw was in the interval 1-4, he would win
$20 if he had selected lottery A and $38.50 if he had selected lottery B. If his second draw was in the interval 5-10,
he would win $16 if he had selected lottery A and $1 if he had selected lottery B.
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all 51 planters. The fifth column presents the cumulative distribution of the number of safe
choices only for planters who gave consistent answers.7
We find that 39.2% of tree planters have risk aversion profiles between extreme risk loving
and risk neutral, and 72.6% have risk profiles between risk loving and weak risk aversion.
These probabilities tend to increase when we exclude planters who gave inconsistent answers.
These results show a significant level of risk tolerance among these workers.
The proportion of workers exhibiting risk tolerant behaviour is much higher than in studies
sampling individuals from broader-based populations. Holt and Laury (2002) performed sim-
ilar experiments on university students. They found that approximately 25% of their sample
displayed risk preferences between risk loving and risk neutral. Harrison, Lau and Rutstro¨m
(2005) found that approximately 23% of subjects randomly drawn from the Danish population
have risk preferences between risk loving and risk neutral. The higher proportion of incentive-
pay workers displaying risk-tolerant preferences is consistent with the sorting hypothesis –
high-powered incentive contracts attract workers who are tolerant to risk.8
4.1 Income Effects
One possible confounding effect for the relatively low incidence of risk aversion in our sample
is that planters vary in their level of seasonal earnings, with some planters having begun work
early in the season, thus having accumulated substantially higher earnings. Greater earnings
has long been believed to foster risk-seeking behavior. If this was the case, then we should
observe a negative and significant relationship between accumulated seasonal earnings (up
until the day of the experiment) and the number of safe choices made in the experiment. 9
Using payroll data from the firm, we were able to test the null hypothesis that accumu-
lated seasonal earnings does not significantly explain risk taking behaviour in our experiment.
Figure 1 presents the past accumulated earnings of planters who took part in the experiment
as a function of the number of safe choices made in the experiment. We do not find a clear
7Inconsistent answers consisted of planters crossing more than once between lotteries. The percentage of
planters giving inconsistent answers was 31.2%. Holt and Laury (2002) report that approximately 15% of students
made inconsistent decisions when first playing such an experiment.
8We discuss this point further in Section 5, below.
9Evidence of income effects when measuring risk aversion has not been observed in laboratory experiments with
student samples (see Holt and Laury (2002)).
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relationship between earnings and the number of safe choices made.
To investigate whether the dispersion in past seasonal earnings of planters is systematically
related to other factors, we use regression techniques developed for count data. In particular,
let N be the number of planters, and si ∈ {0, 1, ..., 10} denote the number of safe decisions
(choices of lottery A) of planter i, where i = 1, 2, ..., N. We model si as a Poisson process with
conditional mean
(1) λi (xi) = exp
(
x′iβ
)
where β denotes a vector of population parameters, and xi denotes a vector of characteristics
including accumulated earnings, a quadratic in accumulated earnings, the number of days of
planting in the current season up until the experiment, a binary variable indicating whether
the planter made consistent decisions in the experiment, and personal characteristics: age and
gender. The likelihood of observing a number of safe decisions S equal to si, conditional on xi,
is given by
Pr (S = si|xi) = e
−λi(xi)λi (xi)
si
si!
Estimates of β are obtained by maximizing the sample log-likelihood function
(2)
1
N
N
∑
i=1
log [Pr (S = si|xi)]
Table 4 presents the regression results with standard errors in parentheses10
These results suggest that our measure of risk aversion is unrelated to income effects. In
particular, we find no evidence of a linear or non-linear relationship between measured risk
aversion and past cumulative earnings. These results hold whether or not we condition on
the number of days worked until the day of the experiment, on whether or not planters made
consistent decisions in the experiment, and on whether or not we condition on age and gender.
One of the possible reasons for the lack of statistical significance in Poisson regressions is due
10A well known restriction of the Poisson regression model is that the conditional variance of si should equal the
conditional mean given in (1). Gourieroux, Monfort and Trognon (1984) have shown that consistent estimates of β
can be obtained by maximizing (2) even if the conditional variance differs from λi (xi) as long as the conditional
mean is well specified. Consistent estimates of the covariance matrix of parameter estimates can than be obtained
using the robust sandwich estimator (see Gourieroux, Monfort and Trognon (1984) for details).
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to under dispersion, which occurs when the conditional variance is lower than the conditional
mean. We tested the null hypothesis of no under dispersion for all for regressions presented
in Table 4.11 The results are presented in the last row of Table 4; we do not reject the null
hypothesis in any of the four specifications.
4.2 Scale effects
Recent research suggests that the distribution of measured risk aversion is not independent
of the scale of lottery payoffs. In particular, measured risk aversion tends to increase when
payoffs are increased (Holt and Laury (2002, 2005)).12
To investigate whether our results are affected by payoff scales, we conducted a follow-
up experiment, involving 66 planters, with higher payoffs. This follow-up experiment was
conducted in the spring of 2006, a year after the initial experiment was completed. 18 of the 51
planters who participated in the baseline experiment participated in the follow up experiment.
The payoffs in the follow-up experiment were double the payoffs from the initial experiment.
Hence, the safe lottery, A, now paid either 40$ or 32$, while the risky lottery, B, now paid 77$
or 2$. As in the baseline experiment, each planter received a 10$ participation fee in addition
to their earnings. Once again, all planters participated.13
Figure 3 presents the distribution of the number of safe choices under both payoff scales.
Somewhat surprisingly, we find both distributions are very similar. There are, perhaps, two
noticeable differences. First, increasing the payoff scale seems to cause a slight shift from weak
risk aversion (5 or 6 safe choices) to risk neutral and weak risk loving (3 and 4 safe choices).
Second, the proportion of planters making no safe choices slightly decreases when the payoff
11The test statistic is based on the auxiliary regression(
si − λ̂i (xi)
)2 − si
λ̂i (xi)
= αλ̂i (xi) + εi
where si is the number of safe decisions of planter i, λ̂i (xi) denotes the predicted conditional mean, εi is an error
term, and α is a slope parameter. The t statistic for α is asymptotically normal N (0, 1) under the null hypothesis of
no under dispersion. See Cameron and Trivedi (1998) for details.
12One implication of this is that a large class of preferences (e.g. CRRA), which are insensitive to payoff scales,
are inappropriate approximations of risk preferences.
13There were more planters in the firm in 2006 than in 2005, explaining the difference in the number of partici-
pants.
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scale is increased. Table 5 compares the cumulative distribution of the number of safe choices
in the baseline and follow up experiments. We see that the proportion of planters who are
either risk neutral or risk loving slightly increases relative to the baseline treatment (42.4%). As
in the baseline treatment, risk aversion appears to decrease when restricting the analysis only
to planters which gave consistent answers.
To further investigate differences in behaviour between the two payoff scales, we conducted
chi square tests on the distributions of measured risk preferences under the low and high payoff
scales.14 The null hypothesis states that the two distributions of measured risk preferences are
from the same population. The chi square tests do not reject the null hypothesis – this, whether
we compare all planters in both treatments (p-value = 0.428), or whether we compare only
planters who gave consistent answers in both treatments (p-value = 0.454).
It is possible that by expanding the firm (to 66 employees), the firm hired a group of risk-
lovers and this counteracts the change in risk-preferences of those who participated in both
experiments. While this possibility would provide additional evidence in favor of sorting, it
also potentially complicates testing for scale effects. One way to control for this effect is to
compare the distributions of the number of safe choices for those 18 planters who took part in
both experiments. This way, the sample of planters used to perform the comparison remains
fixed. Again, a chi square test (p-value = 0.352) is unable to reject the null hypotheses that
the distributions in the baseline and follow up experiments are the same for these planters.
Consequently, we conclude there is no significant evidence that our results are affected by
these changes in payoff scales.15
5 Discussion
To better appreciate the levels of risk tolerance exhibited among these piece-rate workers, we
compare our results to those found for other populations. We focus on studies which have mea-
14The test statistic is given by (p̂l − p̂h)′V̂−1(p̂l − p̂h) where p̂l and p̂h denote 10 by 1 vectors of estimated pro-
portions of planters making 0,1, ..., and 9 safe choices in the low l and high h payoff experiments and V̂−1 is the
estimated variance of (p̂l − p̂h). The asymptotic distribution of the statistic is chi square with 10 degrees of freedom
under the null hypothesis that both distributions are the same.
15We also performed all our tests using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney rank sum test of the null hypothesis of
equal medians. The estimated p-values were consistently above 0.80% in all cases.
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sured risk preferences using the Holt and Laury instrument with similar payoffs. Using similar
payoffs avoids the problem that subjects from other studies appear more risk averse when the
lotteries involve high payoffs (see Holt and Laury, 2002). First, we compare our results with
those obtained by Holt and Laury (2002) on a student population. We use parameter estimates
reported in their paper to predict the proportion of safe decisions their students would make
under our baseline lottery payoffs.16 Second, we compare our results to those in the study by
Elston, Harrisson, and Rutstro¨m (2005) who measured the risk preferences of entrepreneurs
and salaried non-entrepreneurs using the Holt and Laury instrument. Their payoff scale per-
fectly matches the one in our baseline experiment (see Table 2), so we can directly compare
results. They find that salaried non-entrepreneurs are significantly more risk averse than full-
time entrepreneurs. We focus here on the decisions made by the full-time entrepreneurs, since
this reduces the odds that tree planters appear relatively more tolerant to risk.
Figure 2 graphs the proportion of subjects choosing the safe lottery (vertical axis) versus the
decision number corresponding to the rows in Table 2. Higher decision numbers correspond
to increases in the attractiveness of the risky lottery relative to the safe lottery; i.e., as we move
down Table 2. A risk-neutral subject would choose the safe lottery for the first four decision
numbers, before switching to the risky lottery for the remaining decision numbers. Only risk
loving individuals would not chose the safe lottery in any of the first three decisions. The
predicted proportions for students choosing the safe lottery for the first three decisions is very
close to the risk neutral prediction. In the population of full time entrepreneurs, approximately
90% percent of subjects opted for the safe lottery in the first three decisions, an indication that
that full time entrepreneurs have a stronger tolerance for risk than do students. Only between
76% and 80% of the tree planters who took part in our field experiment opted for the safe lottery
in one of the first three decisions, numbers which are significantly lower than for entrepreneurs
and students. As expected, the proportion of subjects choosing the safe lottery diminishes in
the three samples as the decision number increases. More importantly, the proportions playing
16They fit a power-exponential utility function which can account for the effect of changes in payoff scales present
in their design. The power-exponential function over stakes x is given by U(x) = (1− exp(−αx1−r))/α. It can be
shown that constant relative risk aversion is a special case, when α tends to zero. The probability of choosing the
safe option is computed as Pr(sa f e) = EU1/µsa f e/(EU
1/µ
sa f e + EU
1/µ
risky)where EUsa f e and EUrisky are the expected utilities
over the safe and risky lotteries, and µ is a noise parameter. We use the estimated values of Holt and Laury (2002,
p.1653) (r = 0.269, α = 0.029, µ = 0.134).
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the safe lottery converge across the three samples, indicating similar risk taking behavior when
the level of risk decreases. These results suggest that the tree planters are significantly more
tolerant of risk than either the students or the entrepreneurs – planters are more likely to prefer
a risky lottery when risk is high.
6 Conclusion
This study adds to the growing body of research measuring the importance of sorting and se-
lection when evaluating the empirical efficiency of observed contracts. The use of experimental
methods allows us to measure each individual’s willingness to bear risk within a controlled en-
vironment, permitting the characterization of risk tolerance. We find that approximately 40% of
the workers who have self-selected into a particular incentive-paying job are either risk neutral
or risk loving. This percentage is significantly higher than seen in samples from other broader-
based populations, suggesting that sorting over risk preferences is an important characteristic
of labour-market contracts. This has important implications for empirical work on contract
theory. Perhaps most importantly, one cannot reject agency models based on the observed cor-
relation between the incentive intensity of contracts and risk levels. The statistical analyses
of the effect of risk on contracts, based on a comparison of contracts exhibiting different risk
levels, must account for the sorting of workers across contracts.
This study also demonstrates the potential value of field experiments, conducted within the
labour market, to evaluate worker preferences. The presence of random productivity shocks
in tree planting, renders this setting a close approximation to that underlying the standard
principal-agent model. That model assumes that agents know their intrinsic productivity (i.e.
their cost of effort), but their actual productivity also depends on randomness beyond their
control, inducing earnings risk. Conducting field experiments within this setting allows us to
characterize the risk tolerance of workers within an empirically-relevant risky environment,
and evaluate the sorting hypothesis. In contrast, laboratory experiments studying productivity
may have difficulty replicating the risky environment implied by the standard principal-agent
model. These experiments often involve tasks with little or no productivity risk: stuffing en-
velopes (Falk and Ichino, 2006), typing paragraphs (Dickinson, 1999). This hinders their ability
14
to evaluate questions relating to risk and contracts.17 While it may be possible to introduce
risk into these tasks, perhaps by adding a random number to the actual number of tasks per-
formed, this may reduce the realism of the experiment and affect the generalization of results
to real labour markets; see, for example List (2006).
Finally, our results have implications for optimal contracts and the theory of the firm. Tra-
ditional agency models analyze contracts between risk-averse workers and a risk-neutral firm.
Yet, even within the relatively simple organizational environment of a tree-planting firm, con-
tracts can be shaped by many different forces. Importantly, our results suggest that risk-sharing
cannot be the only factor explaining contracts, pointing to the additional importance of worker
heterogeneity and transaction costs. A firm that was capable of tailoring contracts to individ-
uals would simply sell (at least part of) the firm to the risk-tolerant workers; no insurance is
needed. In the absence of individually tailored contracts, the firm balances the forces of risk
sharing, incentives, and heterogeneity to attract and motivate its workforce. Estimating the rel-
ative importance of risk-sharing and transaction costs within this environment is an important
topic of future work.
17In laboratory experiments, risk is often induced by having subjects perform tasks over which their intrinsic
productivity may be uncertain. As a result, subjects who know, or quickly learn, their own productivity face little
or no earnings risk, even when paid piece rates. Consequently, sorting may depend more on ability than risk
preferences; see, for example, Dohmen and Falk (2006).
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Variable Observations Mean Std. Minimum Maximum
Number of trees 1682 833.942 426.076 30 2460
Piece rate 1682 0.244 0.063 0.11 0.62
Daily earnings 1682 196.120 66.434 10.01 442.80
Days of work 51 21.360 22.049 1 87
Table 1: Summary Statistics in baseline experiment. Number of trees, piece-rate and daily
earnings are measured at the planter-day level. Total numbers of days worked before the ex-
periment is measured at the planter level.
Decision Lottery A Lottery B Expected payoff difference
1 1/10 of $20.00, 9/10 of $16.00 1/10 of $38.50, 9/10 of $1.00 $11.70
2 2/10 of $20.00, 8/10 of $16.00 2/10 of $38.50, 8/10 of $1.00 $8.30
3 3/10 of $20.00, 7/10 of $16.00 3/10 of $38.50, 7/10 of $1.00 $5.00
4 4/10 of $20.00, 6/10 of $16.00 4/10 of $38.50, 6/10 of $1.00 $1.60
5 5/10 of $20.00, 5/10 of $16.00 5/10 of $38.50, 5/10 of $1.00 -$1.80
6 6/10 of $20.00, 4/10 of $16.00 6/10 of $38.50, 4/10 of $1.00 -$5.10
7 7/10 of $20.00, 3/10 of $16.00 7/10 of $38.50, 3/10 of $1.00 -$8.50
8 8/10 of $20.00, 2/10 of $16.00 8/10 of $38.50, 2/10 of $1.00 -$11.80
9 9/10 of $20.00, 1/10 of $16.00 9/10 of $38.50, 1/10 of $1.00 -$15.20
10 10/10 of $20.00 10/10 of $38.50 -$18.50
Table 2: Payoff matrix of the baseline experiment.
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Constant 1.611 1.593 1.578 1.659 1.370
(0.087) (0.149) (0.151) (0.141) (0.313)
Past earnings/1000 -0.027 -0.012 -0.067 -0.069 -0.072
(0.020) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.124)
Past earnings2/1E06 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Past days of planting 0.009 0.009 0.008
(0.010) (0.102) (-0.010)
Consistent answers -0.123 -0.092
(0.107) (0.143)
Age 0.008
(0.008)
Female 0.089
(0.174)
Log-likelihood -108.27 -108.25 -107.79 -107.41 -106.79
Equidispersion test (N(0,1)) 0.40 [0.689] 0.49 [0.627] 0.96 [0.343] -0.03 [0.974] 0.212 [0.833]
Table 4: Poisson regression results for the baseline experiment. Dependent variable is the num-
ber of safe choices (choices of lottery A) made. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Sample
size of 51 for all regressions. Under the null hypothesis of that the conditional mean is equal to
the conditional variance, the equidispersion test statistic is asymptotically distributed N(0, 1).
Numbers indicate test value, numbers in square brackets indicate corresponding p-values.
18
Ba
se
lin
e
Fo
llo
w
up
N
br
.s
af
e
ch
oi
ce
s
s
A
ll
pl
an
te
rs
C
on
si
st
en
to
nl
y
A
ll
pl
an
te
rs
C
on
si
st
en
to
nl
y
0-
1
0.
09
8
0.
14
2
0.
07
6
0.
10
2
2
0.
11
7
0.
17
1
0.
09
1
0.
12
4
3
0.
23
5
0.
25
7
0.
21
2
0.
24
5
4
0.
39
2
0.
45
7
0.
42
4
0.
44
9
5
0.
72
6
0.
80
0
0.
72
7
0.
71
4
6
0.
90
2
0.
88
6
0.
84
9
0.
85
7
7
0.
94
1
0.
91
4
0.
92
4
0.
91
8
8
0.
94
1
0.
91
4
0.
96
9
0.
95
9
9-
10
1
1
1
1
Sa
m
pl
e
si
ze
51
35
66
49
Ta
bl
e
5:
C
um
ul
at
iv
e
di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
s
of
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
sa
fe
ch
oi
ce
s
in
th
e
ba
se
lin
e
an
d
fo
llo
w
up
ex
pe
ri
m
en
ts
.
Th
e
se
co
nd
an
d
th
ir
d
co
lu
m
ns
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
pr
es
en
tt
he
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e
di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
s
fo
r
th
e
ba
se
lin
e
ex
pe
ri
m
en
tf
or
al
lp
la
nt
er
s,
an
d
fo
r
on
ly
th
os
e
pl
an
te
rs
w
ho
m
ad
e
co
ns
is
te
nt
an
sw
er
s.
T
he
fo
ur
th
an
d
fif
th
co
lu
m
ns
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
pr
es
en
t
th
e
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e
di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
s
fo
r
th
e
fo
llo
w
up
ex
pe
ri
m
en
tf
or
al
lp
la
nt
er
s,
an
d
fo
r
on
ly
th
os
e
pl
an
te
rs
w
ho
m
ad
e
co
ns
is
te
nt
an
sw
er
s.
19
0
2
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 e
a
rn
in
g
s
 (
in
 d
o
lla
rs
)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number of safe choices
by number of safe choices
Average cumulative earnings before the experiment
Figure 1: Scatterplot of earnings accumulated before the experiment and the number of safe
decisions taken in the baseline experiment. All 51 tree planters.
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utility function reported in Holt and Laury (2002) combined with our payoff scale (see footnote
12). The proportions for full time entrepreneurs are the authors calculations based on Figure 3
of Elston, Harrisson, and Rutstro¨m (2005).
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the distribution under a scale of payoffs twice that of the baseline.
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